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The BB84 quantum key distribution protocol is semi device independent in the sense that it can
be shown to be secure if just one of the users’ devices is restricted to a qubit Hilbert space. Here, we
derive an analytic lower bound on the asymptotic secret key rate for the entanglement-based version of
BB84 assuming only that one of the users performs unknown qubit POVMs. The result holds against
the class of collective attacks and reduces to the well known Shor-Preskill key rate for correlations
corresponding to the ideal BB84 correlations mixed with any amount of random noise.
I. BB84 AND DEVICE INDEPENDENCE
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] protocols allow
cooperating users to generate cryptographic keys in such
a way that unauthorised eavesdropping can be detected.
This is achieved by exploiting features of quantum phys-
ics, such as the general inability to measure a quantum
state without disturbing it, in a way that guarantees
that any attempt at eavesdropping on the protocol will
introduce detectable errors.
One of a QKD protocol’s differentiating features is the
degree to which it is device independent [3–5], i.e., the
extent to which the protocol can be proved secure inde-
pendently of assumptions about the internal functioning
of the devices in the physical setup. This is of practical
interest as device-independent protocols are intrinsically
more robust, ensuring that both unintended and mali-
ciously introduced implementation faults are detected
automatically. Protocols can range from fully charac-
terised (the exact quantum state preparations and/or
measurements must be known) to fully device independ-
ent (security is established based only on the detection
of Bell-nonlocal [6, 7] correlations, independently of the
mechanism that produced them). Between these ex-
tremes, partially device-independent protocols have also
been proposed in which only some of the devices are fully
characterised [8–10] and in which only a Hilbert space
dimension bound is assumed for the source of quantum
states [11, 12].
The BB84 protocol [13] was originally introduced as
a fully characterised protocol. A commonly considered
prepare-and-measure version runs as follows. One user
(“Alice”) generates a string of random bits that she
wishes to transmit to another distant user (“Bob”).
Alice sequentially encodes each bit onto one of two cor-
responding orthogonal σz eigenstates |0〉 and |1〉 which
she transmits to Bob. In order to be able to detect eaves-
dropping, Alice inserts instances of the σx eigenstates
|+〉 and |−〉, with |±〉 = (|0〉± |1〉)/√2, at some random
locations in the sequence of quantum states to be trans-
mitted to Bob. Bob measures most of the states he re-
ceives from Alice in the σz = |0〉〈0|−|1〉〈1| basis and the
∗Erik.Woodhead@icfo.es
remaining minority of cases in the σx = |+〉〈+| − |−〉〈−|
basis. Afterwards, the record of cases where Alice and
Bob used mismatched bases (Alice prepared a σz state
and Bob measured σx or vice versa) are discarded. The
cases where Alice and Bob both used the σx basis and a
randomly chosen subset of cases where they both used
the σz basis are used to estimate the x- and z-basis error
rates δx and δz and then likewise discarded. Finally, if
the error rates are not too high, classical postprocessing
allows a (generally shorter) secret key to be generated
with the relative errors between Alice’s and Bob’s ver-
sions corrected and with any knowledge of the key by an
adversary effectively erased.
There is also an entanglement-based version of BB84,
in which a central source prepares and distributes en-
tangled states which Alice, as well as Bob, measures in
the σz and σx bases. In this case, the initial bitstring
is obtained from the measurement results rather than
from a separate randomness generation procedure. Since
Alice’s σz or σx measurement can be thought of as ef-
fectively preparing a state for Bob [14], there is some
equivalence between the two versions of the protocol. In
particular, in both versions, one-way classical postpro-
cessing allows a secret key to be extracted at an asymp-
totic rate given by the Shor-Preskill key rate [15],
r ≥ 1− h(δx)− h(δz) , (1)
where h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the
binary entropy function, depending on the error rates δx
and δz.
Since its original proposal, it has become apparent
that the BB84 protocol exhibits a significant degree of
device independence. BB84 was first found to be one-
sided device independent, i.e., the explicit characterisa-
tion of one of the devices can be dropped. This was
already indicated by some early security results [16–18]
for the prepare-and-measure version of BB84 which do
not explicitly depend on Bob’s measurements, and later
analyses [19, 20] found that the Shor-Preskill key-rate
bound (1) still holds at the one-sided-device-independent
level if Alice’s source prepares the σz and σx eigen-
states (in the prepare-and-measure version) or just one
of the users measures in the σz and σx bases (in the
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entanglement-based version).
Recent analyses have started to exploit results from
the mismatched bases cases, which are usually discarded,
in order to improve the security certification [21, 22],
and some authors have further pointed out that this can
reduce the level of characterisation required to just a di-
mension bound for one of the devices. In Ref. [23], it was
first shown that the Shor-Preskill rate still holds if no
correlations are observed in the mismatched bases cases
assuming that Alice performs unknown projective qubit
measurements. A similar result was recovered numeric-
ally in Ref. [24] for general qubit POVMs on Alice’s side,
assuming that Bob also performs qubit measurements.
The prepare-and-measure version of BB84 was also stud-
ied numerically in [25] at a similar level of device inde-
pendence, where Alice’s source prepares unknown pure
qubit states and Bob performs unknown projective qubit
measurements.
Here, we study the BB84 protocol in this semi-device-
independent scenario (borrowing the name from [11]),
where we assume only that Alice’s device acts on a two-
dimensional Hilbert space. The main result will be an
analytic lower bound on the asymptotic secret key rate
for the entanglement-based version of BB84 where we al-
low Alice’s measurements to be arbitrary qubit POVMs
and Bob’s measurements are left uncharacterised. The
result holds against the class of collective attacks [17]
(i.e., assuming that Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are
always performed on the same entangled state), which
is known to imply unconditional security at least if the
measurements are memoryless and if the Hilbert-space
dimension is bounded [26].
The qubit device assumption is taken here to mean
that Alice’s result depends only on the measurement
of a qubit state. In particular, similar to [27, 28], we
assume that Alice’s measurement result does not de-
pend on additional classical information that could also
be available to Bob’s device (so-called “shared random-
ness” [11]). This is necessary as the ideal (entanglement-
based) BB84 correlations can be simulated with two
shared classical random bits—a special case of what an
adversary could prepare with a shared classical bit and
an entangled qubit which is completely insecure from a
cryptographic perspective. A consequence is that, un-
usually for a QKD security result, any (nontrivial) lower
bound on the key rate cannot be a convex function of
the probabilities P (ab | uv) at this level of device inde-
pendence.
II. SCENARIO AND MAIN RESULT
In the entanglement-based version of the BB84 pro-
tocol, Alice and Bob share a state ρAB on some Hilbert
space HA ⊗ HB, on which they can perform POVMs
{M (u)0 ,M (u)1 } and {N (v)0 , N (v)1 } indexed by measurement
choices u, v ∈ {z, x} and yielding results a, b ∈ {0, 1}
with probability
P (ab | uv) = Tr[(M (u)a ⊗N (v)b )ρAB] . (2)
In the semi-device-independent level of security that we
consider, we assume that dimHA = 2. The state ρAB
and measurements are otherwise treated as unknown.
Setting Aˆu = M
(u)
0 −M (u)1 and Bˆv = N (v)0 − N (v)1 , a
convenient summary of the probabilities P (ab | uv) that
we will use is given by the eight parameters
Au = 〈Aˆu ⊗ 1B〉 , (3)
Bv = 〈1A ⊗ Bˆv〉 , (4)
Euv = 〈Aˆu ⊗ Bˆv〉 , (5)
with 〈 · 〉 = Tr[ · ρAB]. Note that Ezz and Exx here
are related to the more conventional z- and x-basis error
rates δz and δx by Euu = 1− 2δu.
The full security analysis of the protocol will be under-
taken in the next section, but it is worth already sketch-
ing a result for the special case where Alice performs
rank-one projective measurements since one can be de-
rived directly from the Shor-Preskill rate. In this scen-
ario, where Alice’s z and x measurements simply pro-
ject into orthogonal bases {|0z〉, |1z〉} and {|0x〉, |1x〉},
essentially the only relevant parameter differentiating
the measurements is the Bloch-sphere angle between
them. For some suitable basis {|0w〉, |1w〉} conjugate to
{|0z〉, |1z〉}, we may write
Aˆx = cos(ϕ)Aˆz + sin(ϕ)Aˆw , (6)
where Aˆw = |0w〉〈0w|− |1w〉〈1w| and ϕ is the (unknown)
Bloch-sphere angle between Aˆz and Aˆx. Setting Ewx =
〈Aˆw ⊗ Bˆx〉, linearity of the quantum expectation value
implies the relation
Exx = cos(ϕ)Ezx + sin(ϕ)Ewx . (7)
The conjugate “w basis” introduced here is useful be-
cause the (one-sided-device-independent) Shor-Preskill
key rate applies to it. Introducing, for convenience, the
function
φ(x) = 1− 12 (1+x) log2(1+x)− 12 (1−x) log2(1−x) (8)
(related to the binary entropy by φ(x) = h( 12± 12x)), the
Shor-Preskill rate can be expressed as
r ≥ 1− φ(Ewx)− φ(Ezz) . (9)
From here, it is a simple matter to obtain a key-rate
bound depending only on the observed correlations.
From the relation (7) between the correlators, we ob-
tain
|Exx| ≤ |cos(ϕ)||Ezx|+ |sin(ϕ)||Ewx|
≤
√
E 2zx + E
2
wx , (10)
which rearranges to
E 2wx ≥ E 2xx − E 2zx . (11)
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As long as |Exx| ≥ |Ezx|, this implies the lower bound
r ≥ 1− φ(√E 2xx − E 2zx )− φ(Ezz) (12)
for the key rate.
More generally, it is clear that the key-rate bound
(12) cannot hold against arbitrary POVMs on Alice’s
side. A simple counterexample is that if we allow
Alice to perform the degenerate projective measurement
{M (z)0 ,M (z)1 } = {1A, 0A}, it is possible for Alice and Bob
to obtain the result a = b = 0 deterministically (which
is completely insecure) while observing the correlations
Exx = Ezz = 1 and Ezx = 0 (for which (12) would
imply r = 1). Of course, this particular pathological
case is easily detected since Alice and Bob could notice
that they keep getting the same measurement results. In
terms of the parameterisation given above, we thus do
not expect (12) to still apply if Az = 1.
There is a significant parameter range in which the
rate (12) still holds, though. The main result of this
article is that the asymptotic rate (12) still applies, at
least against collective attacks, if the correlations satisfy
|Exx| > |Bx| and
E 2xx + E
2
zx ≤ 1− 2|Az − EzxBx|+A 2z . (13)
This is proved in the next section. As a special case, we
recover the Shor-Preskill rate
r ≥ 1− φ(Exx)− φ(Ezz) (14)
if there are no correlations in the mismatched bases cases
(so that Ezx = 0) and if |Bx| < |Exx| ≤ 1 − |Az|; the
latter constraint reduces to |Exx| > 0 (which is necessary
to certify a nonzero key rate anyway) if Alice’s and Bob’s
marginal results are equiprobable (so that Az = Bx = 0).
In principle, the derivation given in the next section
could be pursued further in order to derive a lower bound
for the key rate in the case that the condition (13) is not
satisfied. There is an easier way of getting a result for
this case, though. Since the condition (13) and key rate
(12) are device independent on Bob’s side, we can simply
apply the result they would imply if Bob’s measurement
operator Bˆx were scaled down to λBˆx for some scaling
factor 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. This way, we can use the modified
bound
r ≥ 1− φ(λ√E 2xx − E 2zx )− φ(Ezz) , (15)
taking for λ the highest number between zero and one
satisfying
λ2
(
E 2xx + E
2
zx
)
= 1− 2|Az − λ2EzxBx|+A 2z . (16)
III. PROOF OF MAIN RESULT
Problem definition
In the worst-case scenario, Alice, Bob, and the adversary
Eve share a purification |Ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB⊗HE, prepared
by Eve, of the state ρAB responsible for the observed cor-
relations according to (2). When Alice measures u = z,
the system in HB ⊗ HE is projected to the (unnormal-
ised) state
ρ = TrA
[
(M
(z)
0 ⊗ 1BE)Ψ
]
(17)
or
ρ′ = TrA
[
(M
(z)
1 ⊗ 1BE)Ψ
]
, (18)
depending, respectively, on whether Alice gets the result
a = 0 or a = 1. (We will in general write, e.g., Ψ as
a shorthand for the density operator |Ψ〉〈Ψ| associated
to some pure state |Ψ〉.) The normalisations of these
states are related to the probabilities with which they
are prepared according to Tr[ρ] = PA(0 | z) and Tr[ρ′] =
PA(1 | z). The correlation between Alice’s result a and
the state available to Eve is summarised by the classical-
quantum state
τAE = |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ′E , (19)
in terms of Eve’s parts ρE = TrB[ρ] and ρ
′
E = TrB[ρ
′] of
the possible density operators ρ and ρ′.
We consider the case where the key is extracted from
the u = v = z measurement results. In this case, the one-
way asymptotic key rate secure against collective attacks
is lower bounded by the Devetak-Winter rate [29], which
can be expressed as the difference of two entropies
r = H(A | E)−H(A | B) . (20)
In (20), H(A | B) is the Shannon entropy of Alice’s out-
come conditioned on Bob’s and can either be computed
directly or approximated by H(A | B) ≤ h(δz) = φ(Ezz).
The main problem, and the main goal of this section, is
to derive a lower bound for the conditional von Neumann
entropy H(A | E), which is given by
H(A | E) = S(τAE)− S(τE)
= S(ρE) + S(ρ
′
E)− S(ρE + ρ′E) , (21)
where S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log2(ρ)], when computed on the
classical-quantum state (19).
The derivation followed in the remainder of this sec-
tion uses a few mathematical tools (two of which are
minor restatements of results in [30]) which are presen-
ted here as lemmas. Proofs for these are supplied as
appendices to this article.
General proof outline
The starting point is the following relation for the condi-
tional von Neumann entropy, which simplifies the prob-
lem to that of lower bounding the fidelity between the
marginal states available to Eve.
Lemma 1. The conditional von Neumann entropy,
computed on the classical-quantum state |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE +
|1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ′E, is lower bounded by
H(A | E) ≥ φ(Az)− φ
(√
A 2z + 4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2
)
(22)
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in terms of the fidelity F (ρE, ρ
′
E) between ρE and ρ
′
E.
Furthermore, for fixed F (ρE, ρ
′
E), the right-hand side of
(22) is convex in Az and is minimised with Az = 0.
Here, we take the fidelity to be defined by F (ρ, σ) =
‖√ρ√σ‖1, where ‖A‖1 = Tr[|A|] = Tr[
√
A†A] denotes
the trace norm of an operator A, for (generally unnorm-
alised) density operators ρ and σ. Note that the minim-
isation of (22) at Az = 0 allows the bound for the von
Neumann entropy to be simplified to
H(A | E) ≥ 1− φ(2F (ρE, ρ′E)) , (23)
though this step is optional, since Az is an observed para-
meter.
The approach we follow involves reducing the problem
to considering pure states. To this end, we introduce or-
thonormal bases {|0u〉, |1u〉}, u ∈ {z, x}, in which Alice’s
(qubit Hermitian) POVM elements M
(u)
a are diagonal.
In these bases, Alice’s POVMs can be expressed as con-
vex sums
{M (u)0 ,M (u)1 } = m(u)1 {0u, 1u}+m(u)2 {1u, 0u}
+m
(u)
3 {1A, 0A}+m(u)4 {0A, 1A} (24)
of the four projective measurements {0u, 1u}, {1u, 0u},
{1A, 0A}, and {0A, 1A} for convex coefficients satisfying
m
(u)
i ≥ 0 and
∑
im
(u)
i = 1. (Here, 0u and 1u are short-
hand for |0u〉〈0u| and |1u〉〈1u|, and 1A and 0A denote
the identity and null operators on HA.)
Concentrating on the z measurement, we can express
the entangled state as
|Ψ〉 = |0z〉|α〉+ |1z〉|α′〉 (25)
for (unnormalised and not necessarily orthogonal) states
|α〉, |α′〉 ∈ HB ⊗ HE. The fidelity between Eve’s parts
αE and α
′
E of the states |α〉 and |α′〉 introduced this way
can, according to the following relation, be bounded in
terms of an operator WB on Bob’s Hilbert space.
Lemma 2. The fidelity between Eve’s partial traces αE
and α′E of the pure states |α〉 and |α′〉 satisfies
2F (αE, α
′
E) ≥ ‖WB‖1 , (26)
where WB = TrE[W ] and W = |α〉〈α′|+ |α′〉〈α|.
We approach the problem of lower bounding ‖WB‖1
in the following way. Similar to (25), we express the
entangled state as
|Ψ〉 = |0x〉|β〉+ |1x〉|β′〉 (27)
for the u = x measurement. In an appropriate phase
convention, the diagonalising bases are related by
|0z〉 = cos(ϕ2 )|0x〉 − sin(ϕ2 )|1x〉 , (28)
|1z〉 = sin(ϕ2 )|0x〉+ cos(ϕ2 )|1x〉 (29)
for some angle ϕ. From this and requiring that (25) and
(27) are the same state, we extract
|β〉 = cos(ϕ2 )|α〉+ sin(ϕ2 )|α′〉 , (30)
|β′〉 = − sin(ϕ2 )|α〉+ cos(ϕ2 )|α′〉 . (31)
Introducing the correlators
E¯zx = Tr
[
Bˆx(αB − α′B)
]
, (32)
E¯xx = Tr
[
Bˆx(βB − β′B)
]
(33)
for the pure states and
E¯wx = Tr
[
BˆxWB
]
(34)
for the operator W appearing in Lemma 2, the relations
(30) and (31) imply
E¯xx = cos(ϕ)E¯zx + sin(ϕ)E¯wx , (35)
and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and re-
arranging, we obtain
E¯ 2wx ≥ E¯ 2xx − E¯ 2zx , (36)
similar to the outline of the previous section. Finally,
since Bˆx is the difference of two POVM elements, it sat-
isfies the operator inequalities −1B ≤ Bˆx ≤ 1B; this
allows E¯wx to be used as a lower bound on the trace
norm ‖WB‖1 of WB:
E¯wx = Tr
[
BˆxWB
] ≤ ‖WB‖1‖Bˆx‖∞ ≤ ‖WB‖1 , (37)
from which we finally obtain
4F (αE, α
′
E)
2 ≥ E¯ 2xx − E¯ 2zx . (38)
The remaining problem is to convert (38) into a lower
bound on F (ρE, ρ
′
E) depending on the observed paramet-
ers Au, Bv, and Euv which can be used in Lemma 1 (or
(23)). Part of the problem is to relate these parameters
to the pure-state versions E¯xx and E¯zx appearing in (38).
From the POVM decomposition (24) we can deduce
Euv = (m
(u)
1 −m(u)2 )E¯uv + (m(u)3 −m(u)4 )Bv , (39)
which will allow the E¯uvs to be related to the Euvs and
Bvs. For the z measurement, we will also need to be able
to relate the fidelity F (αE, α
′
E) in (38) to F (ρE, ρ
′
E). For
this, we will need the following general bound for the
fidelity between mixtures of two states.
Lemma 3. Let ρ, σ, τ0, and τ1 be (not necessarily nor-
malised) density operators related by
ρ = p0τ0 + p1τ1 , (40)
σ = q0τ0 + q1τ1 (41)
for parameters p0, p1, q0, q1 ≥ 0. Then,
F (ρ, σ)2 ≥ (√p0q0‖τ0‖1 +√p1q1‖τ1‖1)2
+
(√
p0q1 −√p1q0
)2
F (τ0, τ1)
2 . (42)
4
Alice’s x POVM
The u = x measurement is the simplest to handle, since
it is not used for key generation, so we deal with it first.
Rewriting the decomposition (39) for Exx as
Exx = λE¯xx + µBx , (43)
with λ = m
(x)
1 −m(x)2 and µ = m(x)3 −m(x)4 , the triangle
inequality and the constraint |µ| ≤ 1−|λ| together imply
|Exx| ≤ |λ||E¯xx|+ (1− |λ|)|Bx| , (44)
which rearranges to
|λ|(|E¯xx| − |Exx|) ≥ (1− |λ|)(|Exx| − |Bx|) . (45)
If |Exx| > |Bx| then the only way that (45) can be satis-
fied is if |λ| > 0 and if |E¯xx| ≥ |Exx|. In this case Exx can
safely be substituted in place of E¯xx in the pure-state fi-
delity bound (38). Otherwise, it is perfectly possible
for the x measurement POVM decomposition (43) to be
satisfied with E¯xx = 0. In the following, we will assume
that |Exx| > |Bx|, since (38) becomes trivial otherwise.
Alice’s z POVM
The POVM decomposition (24) implies that the states
ρ and ρ′ prepared on HB ⊗HE are related to α and α′
by
ρ = m
(z)
1 α+m
(z)
2 α
′ +m(z)3 (α+ α
′) , (46)
ρ′ = m(z)1 α
′ +m(z)2 α+m
(z)
4 (α+ α
′) . (47)
In general, the decomposition (24) for POVMs is not
unique, so we have some freedom to choose a decom-
position which will simplify the problem of turning the
fidelity bound
4F (αE, α
′
E)
2 ≥ E 2xx − E¯ 2zx (48)
into a lower bound for F (ρE, ρ
′
E) depending on observed
parameters Au, Bv, and Euv. Specifically, the identity
{0z, 1z}+ {1z, 0z} = {1A, 0A}+ {0A, 1A} (49)
implies that one of the POVMs {1A, 0A} or {0A, 1A} can
always be eliminated, meaning we can assume that one
of m
(z)
3 and m
(z)
4 in (24) is zero without loss of generality.
We proceed in two steps, first considering mixtures of
the measurements {0z, 1z} and {1z, 0z}, before account-
ing for a contribution from one of the measurements
{1A, 0A} or {0A, 1A}. In anticipation, and assuming a
contribution from {0A, 1A} for example, we reexpress
(46) and (47) as
ρ = p(qα+ q′α′) , (50)
ρ′ = p(q′α+ qα′) + p′(α+ α′) , (51)
where the nonnegative parameters p, p′, q, q′ are related
to the m
(z)
i s by p = m
(z)
1 + m
(z)
2 , p
′ = m(z)4 , pq = m
(z)
1 ,
and pq′ = m(z)2 , and satisfy p+ p
′ = q + q′ = 1.
For the contribution from {0z, 1z} and {1z, 0z}, we set
ρ¯ = qα+ q′α′ , (52)
ρ¯′ = q′α+ qα′ , (53)
and, applying Lemma 3 and the pure-state fidelity bound
(48), we have
4F (ρ¯E, ρ¯
′
E)
2 ≥ 4qq′ + (q − q′)24F (αE, α′E)2
≥ 4qq′ + (q − q′)2(E 2xx − E¯ 2zx ) . (54)
Introducing the correlator
E¯zx = Tr
[
Bˆx(ρ¯B − ρ¯′B)
]
, (55)
related to E¯zx by E¯zx = (q − q′)E¯zx, and using that
4qq′ ≥ 4qq′E 2xx ,
4F (ρ¯E, ρ¯
′
E)
2 ≥ (4qq′ + (q − q′)2)E 2xx − E¯ 2zx
= (q + q′)2E 2xx − E¯ 2zx , (56)
or
4F (ρ¯E, ρ¯
′
E)
2 ≥ E 2xx − E¯ 2zx , (57)
which shows that allowing mixtures of the measurements
{0z, 1z} and {1z, 0z} alone will not affect the key-rate
formula.
Finally, we account for the effect of a contribution
from one of the degenerate measurements {1A, 0A} or
{0A, 1A}. Assuming first a contribution from {0A, 1A},
according to (50) and (51) and using that ρ¯+ρ¯′ = α+α′,
ρ and ρ′ are related to the states ρ¯ and ρ¯′ defined above
by
ρ = pρ¯ , (58)
ρ′ = p′ρ¯+ ρ¯′ . (59)
Applying Lemma 3 again,
F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 ≥ pp′‖ρ¯‖ 21 + pF (ρ¯E, ρ¯′E)2 . (60)
Inserting the lower bound (57) for F (ρ¯E, ρ¯
′
E) and recog-
nising that
p‖ρ¯‖1 = ‖ρ‖1 = PA(0 | z) = (1 +Az)/2 , (61)
the lower bound for F (ρE, ρ
′
E) becomes
4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 ≥ ( 1p − 1)(1 +Az)2 + pE 2xx − pE¯ 2zx . (62)
The observed parameters
Ezx = Tr
[
Bˆx(ρB − ρ′B)
]
(63)
and
Bx = Tr
[
Bˆx(ρB + ρ
′
B)
]
= Tr
[
Bˆx(ρ¯B + ρ¯
′
B)
]
(64)
are related to E¯zx by
Ezx = pE¯zx − p′Bx . (65)
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Rearranging for E¯zx and inserting in (62), we obtain
4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 ≥ ( 1p − 1)(1 +Az)2 + pE 2xx
− p
(
1
pEzx +
(
1
p − 1
)
Bx
)2
, (66)
or, subtracting E 2xx − E 2zx from both sides,
4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 − (E 2xx − E 2zx )
≥ ( 1p − 1)[(1 +Az)2 − p(E 2xx −B 2x )
− (Ezx +Bx)2
]
. (67)
By following similar reasoning starting from the decom-
position
ρ = ρ¯+ p′ρ¯′ , (68)
ρ′ = pρ¯′ , (69)
assuming a contribution from {1A, 0A} instead of
{0A, 1A}, we obtain the same result as (67) except with
the sign changes Az → −Az and Bx → −Bx. The worst
of the two bounds obtained this way is
4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 − (E 2xx − E 2zx )
≥ ( 1p − 1)[1− 2|Az − EzxBx|+A 2z
− p(E 2xx −B 2x )− (E 2zx +B 2x )
]
. (70)
The multiplicative factor 1/p− 1 is nonnegative, so the
right-hand side of (70) is nonnegative if
p(E 2xx −B 2x ) + (E 2zx +B 2x )
≤ 1− 2|Az − EzxBx|+A 2z . (71)
Finally, since we are assuming |Exx| > |Bx|, the term
p(E 2xx − B 2x ) is nonnegative and is maximised with p
= 1. This implies that (71) is satisfied for all p ≤ 1 if it
is satisfied for p = 1, i.e., if
E 2xx + E
2
zx ≤ 1− 2|Az − EzxBx|+A 2z , (72)
which is the condition given in the previous section. If
this condition is met then the lower bound
4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 ≥ E 2xx − E 2zx (73)
can be used for the fidelity in Lemma 1.
IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding section proves that the key rate asymptot-
ically secure against collective attacks for BB84 is lower
bounded by
r ≥ φ(Az)− φ
(√
A 2z + E
2
xx − E 2zx
)− φ(Ezz) (74)
if |Exx| > |Bx| and if the condition (72) is satisfied. This
is never less than the simpler bound (12) claimed in sec-
tion II. If (72) is not satisfied, device independence on
Bob’s side still allows the main result to be used with the
replacements Exx → λExx and Ezx → λEzx, with the
scaling factor λ determined by (16) above. Together,
these give a general semi-device-independent security
result for the BB84 protocol against collective (and pos-
sibly [26] more general) attacks. The traditional set of
assumptions used to prove the security of the BB84 pro-
tocol can thus be relaxed to a significant degree. It is
still necessary to trust that one of the users’ measure-
ments are restricted to a two-dimensional Hilbert space,
but exact knowledge of the measurements beyond this is
not required.
In the scenario considered, aside from the qubit re-
striction on Alice’s side, Alice’s and Bob’s measurements
were allowed to be arbitrary POVMs. One could go fur-
ther, similar to [27, 28], and imagine that Eve may have
more detailed knowledge of the measurements. Specific-
ally, the approach followed in this article could probably
be modified to allow Eve to know the indices i and j
in decompositions of the form M
(u)
a =
∑
i piM
(u)
a;i and
N
(v)
b =
∑
j qjN
(v)
b;j for the POVM elements, although
the resulting key rate will probably not include the Shor-
Preskill rate as a special case if the adversary is granted
this extra power.
Finally, the main result was derived for the
entanglement-based version of BB84. It is likely that
a similar result should hold for the prepare-and-measure
BB84 variant assuming a source which is restricted to
emitting qubit states, which was tested in a recent im-
plementation [31]. Adapting the approach followed here
for the prepare-and-measure scenario is thus an obvious
problem for future work.
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Proof of Lemma 1
The conditional von Neumann entropy satisfies H(A |
E) ≥ H(A | EE′) for any extension HE ⊗ HE′ of Eve’s
Hilbert space HE. We use this to replace the (un-
normalised) density operators ρE and ρ
′
E appearing in
the classical-quantum state (19) with purifications |ψ〉
and |ψ′〉; by Uhlmann’s theorem (which still holds for
unnormalised states), these can be chosen such that
〈ψ|ψ′〉 = F (ρE, ρ′E). We this way obtain
H(A | E) ≥ S(ψ) + S(ψ′)− S(ψ + ψ′)
= h
(
PA(0 | z)
)− h(λ+) , (75)
where
λ± = 12 ± 12
√
(‖ψ‖1 − ‖ψ′‖1)2 + 4F (ρE, ρ′E)2 (76)
are the eigenvalues of ψ + ψ′. Recognising that
‖ψ‖1 − ‖ψ′‖1 = ‖ρ‖1 − ‖ρ′‖1
= PA(0 | z)− PA(1 | z)
= Az , (77)
we obtain
H(A | E) ≥ φ(Az)− φ
(√
A 2z + 4F (ρE, ρ
′
E)
2
)
, (78)
which is the lower bound claimed in the statement of
Lemma 1.
The right-hand side of (78) has the form
f(x) = φ(x)− φ(√x2 + y2) , (79)
where we treat y as a fixed parameter and x should sat-
isfy x2 + y2 ≤ 1. We show that this function is convex
by lower bounding its second derivative. First, the first
and second derivatives of φ are
φ′(x) = −1
2
log2
(
1 + x
1− x
)
(80)
and
φ′′(x) = − 1
ln(2)
1
1− x2 . (81)
Applying the product rule, the first and second derivat-
ives of f are
f ′(x) = φ′(x)− φ′(√x2 + y2) x√
x2 + y2
(82)
and
f ′′(x) = φ′′(x)− φ′′(√x2 + y2) x2
x2 + y2
− φ′(√x2 + y2) y2
(x2 + y2)3/2
. (83)
Using that ln
( 1+|x|
1−|x|
) ≥ 2|x|, the last term can be re-
placed with
− φ′(√x2 + y2) y2
(x2 + y2)3/2
≥ 1
ln(2)
y2
x2 + y2
, (84)
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so that
f ′′(x) ≥ 1
ln(2)
[
− 1
1− x2
+
1
1− x2 − y2
x2
x2 + y2
+
y2
x2 + y2
]
=
1
ln(2)
[
− 1
1− x2 +
1− y2
1− x2 − y2
]
=
1
ln(2)
x2y2
(1− x2)(1− x2 − y2)
≥ 0 , (85)
which shows that f is convex. Noticing that f ′(0) = 0
(or just that f is an even function) implies that x = 0 is
the global minimum.
Proof of Lemma 2
A basic property of the trace norm is that ‖WB‖1 =
Tr[UBWB] for some unitary operator UB; furthermore,
since WB is Hermitian, UB can also be taken to be Her-
mitian. From here and using that W = |α〉〈α′|+ |α′〉〈α|,
‖WB‖1 = Tr[UBWB]
= Tr
[
(UB ⊗ 1E)W
]
= 2 Re
[〈α|UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉]
≤ 2∣∣〈α|UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉∣∣
≤ 2F (αE, α′E) . (86)
The final line follows, by Uhlmann’s theorem, from no-
ticing that |α〉 and UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉 are purifications of αE
and α′E.
Proof of Lemma 3
We introduce purifications |χ0〉 and |χ1〉 of τ0 and τ1
such that F (τ0, τ1) = 〈χ0|χ1〉. In terms of these, note
that
|ψ〉 = √p0|χ0〉|γ0〉+√p1|χ1〉|γ1〉 , (87)
|φ〉 = √q0|χ0〉|δ0〉+√q1|χ1〉|δ1〉 , (88)
where {|γ0〉, |γ1〉} and {|δ0〉, |δ1〉} are orthonormal bases,
are purifications of ρ and σ. Using Uhlmann’s theorem
and expanding, the fidelity between ρ and σ is lower
bounded by
F (ρ, σ) ≥ ∣∣〈ψ|φ〉∣∣
=
∣∣∣∑
ij
√
piqj〈χi|χj〉〈γi|δj〉
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∑
ij
√
piqjF (τi, τj)Uji
∣∣∣
=
∣∣Tr[UT ]∣∣ , (89)
where U and T are the matrices of elements Uji = 〈γi|δj〉
and Tij =
√
piqjF (τi, τj). By exploiting the freedom to
choose the bases {|γ0〉, |γ1〉} and {|δ0〉, |δ1〉}, U can be
made to be any 2 × 2 unitary matrix. Maximising the
right-hand side over U , we obtain
F (ρ, σ) ≥ ‖T‖1 , (90)
with
T =
[ √
p0q0‖τ0‖1 √p0q1F (τ0, τ1)√
p1q0F (τ0, τ1)
√
p1q1‖τ1‖1
]
, (91)
in which we inserted that F (τi, τi) = ‖τi‖1.
In general, the trace norm of a 2×2 matrix M = [ α βγ δ ]
is given by
‖M‖1 =
√
T + 2
√
D , (92)
where
T = |α|2 + |β|2 + |γ|2 + |δ|2 , (93)√
D =
∣∣αδ − βγ∣∣ (94)
are respectively the trace of |M |2 = M†M and the root
of its determinant. Applying this to obtain an explicit
expression for the trace norm of (91) and using that
F (τ0, τ1) ≤
√‖τ0‖1√‖τ1‖1 produces the result
F (ρ, σ)2 ≥ (√p0q0‖τ0‖1 +√p1q1‖τ1‖1)2
+
(√
p0q1 −√p1q0
)2
F (τ0, τ1)
2 . (95)
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